DIPLOWEB.com Geopolitics of Cyprus.Part 4th.Cyprus and Europe
By amk, 01/11/2022

DIPLOWEB.com Geopolitics of Cyprus.Part 4th.Cyprus and Europe

See the first part of this J-F Drevet study, geopolitics of Cyprus.See the second part.See the third part.See the fourth part.

The EU has entered back into the eastern Mediterranean basin and its endless conflicts.Its presence is of a different nature from that, much stronger, which it maintains in the Western basin.This is a peculiarity that we can explain, among other things, both by the history and by the originality of the European project.

After the loss of Cyprus (1571)) then from Crete, the decline in Venice leaves the whole East basin in the hands of the sultan and European monarchies have a hard time containing Ottoman expansionism in the Western basin: its coast is regularly ravagedBy barbaric pirates, it is deserted by the Corsican or Sardinian villagers who take refuge in the mountains.Between Spain and the Knights of Malta, the war is permanent.

A century later, the balance of power is reversed and the Ottoman decadence stimulates lusts.Projects for sharing the Empire appear, between Joseph II and Catherine II, then between Napoleon and Alexandre 1er.If they had been carried out, Russia would have played the main role.It would probably have developed its influence in the Balkans and possibly formed a neo-by-by-by-Byzantine state in Constantinople.Thus it would have been absorbed by this task during most of the 19th century, which would have made it less aggressive on its other borders.The Balkans would have disposed of an additional century to stabilize and the eastern basin would have been more strongly integrated into Europe than it was in 1914.

From what history manuals call the "Eastern question" that has not happened, because the rivalries of the powers, especially between Russia and the United Kingdom, artificially preserved the Ottoman Empire, despite its weaknesses.The "sick man from Europe" thus survived until the beginning of the 20th century, before disappearing after a tragic decade (1912-1922)).Thus has imposed the English vision of a linear Mediterranean, segment of the "India Route", where the European presence has remained much less marked than in the Western basin, where France, Italy and Spain haveconquered the Maghreb.By taking over from the British, the United States has confirmed the role of corridor of the eastern basin, between the pressure from the countries of the Warsaw Pact in the North and Prosoviet Arab Nationalism in the South.

Of all these adventures, Cyprus has long been preserved.Since 1878, it has been under British administration and has only been caught up in the middle of the 20th century by a resurgence of the "Hundred Years War" launched in 1820 by the Greek War of Independence which seemed to have ended in 1923 with theTreaty of Lausanne.This last phase will only be more tragic.

European construction has started in the Carolingian space after the Second World War, with a center of gravity between the Scheldt and the Rhine, based on Franco-German reconciliation.Originally, it has no Mediterranean dimension and Italy does not weigh a very important weight.It is necessary to wait for the membership of Spain and Portugal (1986)) that a group of Member States emerges able to contribute to the joint decisions to collect its budgetary advantages by the reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP))and above all the implementation of a policy of development of disadvantaged regions.

In this group, Greece is the only country belonging to the eastern basin and it will remain so until the membership of Cyprus in 2004.Despite her association with the common market (with Turkey)) by a treaty dates back to 1963, she did not maintain very close relations with Brussels.They were even suspended during the Colonels dictatorship (1967-1974)), which the EEC countries did not fight with fierce energy.This is why the request for membership filed after the return to democracy was accepted and dealt with with an indulgence which was then the subject of many criticisms.By going quickly, the government of Athens managed to disjoin its case of that of Turkey which benefited from an identical association agreement opening the way.In fact, there were other priorities in Ankara and the 1980 Turkish coup had definitively widened the gap between the two countries.

For a long time, the EU does not give much importance to its neighborhood and in particular to the eastern Mediterranean basin, despite Greek protests.Regarding Cyprus, the United Kingdom before Brexit has constantly encouraged the EU not to deal with it, Washington being in similar arrangements.Consequently, European Union policy in the region has long been a by-product of inter-mediterranean cooperation.

From a geopolitical point of view, seen from Brussels there is no symmetry between the two Mediterranean basins, which does not give Greece and Cyprus the same role as in the Western basin countries.Turkey now having "intended" to remain a third country, despite the integration process offered by the customs union, Brusselsy's ability to influence is low and will remain so.However, the EU faces more than elsewhere with the rivalries of the great powers and recently with third countries sometimes aggressive.Its economic and commercial impact is less since these countries do with it only a small part of their exchanges with it, unlike the Maghreb.

With more responsibilities than influence the EU lacks mental and strategic capacities to take into account such a great complexity, being devoid of the strategic vision which also lacks in the neighboring spaces of the Balkans andMiddle East ?

Obviously, the EU is not equipped to confront regional imperialisms, in particular that of Turkey, of its expansionist policy stimulated by the International of the Muslim Brotherhood, support for jihadist groups and the commissioning ofnew drones.In this fight, the EU cannot hope for a lot of help: the United States of Trump has already shown their indifference, Russia manipulates Turkey, China advances its pawns on the "Silk Road" and the powersregional (especially Iran and Saudi Arabia)) push their advantages to the detriment of the stability of the whole.Interminable wars are therefore not likely to end.

Cyprus foreign policy before joining the EU

Since 1960, Cyprus has endeavored to increase his security by several means that have not been successful.In this evolution, we can distinguish two successive stages:

.Makarios' non-alignment (1960-1974))

.Military partnership with Greece (in the 1990s)).

Illusions of non-alignment

In 1959, by accepting under a strong constraint the agreements of Zurich and London, Makarios did not only give up Enossis.According to Perry Anderson, these agreements included a secret annex in which the GDC undertook to join NATO and ban the Communist Party Akel.It was not to the taste of the ethnarch: learning the lessons of the pressure suffered, he considered that his duty was to make his island evolve towards the "unfetied independence" which would finally allow him to dispose of herself.

Makarios not having written his memories, it is difficult to reconstruct the deep springs of the strategy followed during his presidency (1960-1977)).Between Turkish Cypriots, Akel Communists and Enossis fans, its initial position is not very solid.He knows that union with Greece is impossible, but it is poorly placed to make it admitted to Greek Cypriots who are still very attached to it.

He knows his limits and knows how to make use of the cards he has.One of them is foreign policy where, as President of the Republic, his room for maneuver is more important.Now independent, benefiting from international recognition and a siege at the United Nations, the island has in principle become free of its alliances.As a result, he made his first visit abroad in Nassérienne Egypt.In September 1961, he went to Belgrade to participate in the conference of the 24 non-aligned countries.In the context of decolonization, which brings to the United Nations an important group of recently independent countries, it can rely on them.Cyprus also ensures important supports among the neutral European, notably Tito Yugoslavia.By placing himself at the equidistence of the two protagonists of the Cold War, he believes that he has a good chance of freeing himself from the protectorate of the Guarantor Powers.

At first, he obtained results.In 1964, after the break with Turkish Cypriots, despite British pressures to bring in NATO forces, Makarios managed to involve the United Nations.He even obtained the support of the USSR which threatens NATO of reprisals in the event of intervention in Cyprus.Lyndon Johnson then decides to ban the Turkish army from landing on the island, a rare example of Washington firmness vis-à-vis aggressive Ankara projects.The non -alignment has paid, although it displeases strongly to the guaranteed powers.Humiliated by American attitude, Turkey is starting to get closer to the USSR.

Although triumphantly re -elected in 1968, Makarios had to face the opposition of Turkish Cypriots, but nostalgic for Enossis encouraged by Greek colonels.After having tried to assassinate him in vain, they managed to overthrow him in July 1974, thus offering Turkey the opportunity to intervene that she had been waiting for ten years.

In Washington, there is no one left to discourage it, because the international context has changed since 1964.For several years, American diplomats have been acquired at the idea of sharing, believing that it is the best way to definitively solve the Greco-Turkish dispute and to integrate de facto Cyprus into NATO, leaving the armyof Ankara to settle on the island.Very weakened by the Watergate scandal, President R.Nixon leaves his hands free to his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a supporter of the hot crises solution.

There is no longer room for a neutralist foreign policy.However, in the Mediterranean of the Cold War, the bet of the non -alignment could succeed.In another context, it was successfully practiced by Dom Mintoff [1].Having become independent in September 1964, Malta obtained the evacuation of a large British base.Its geopolitical position having lost part of its value, its neutralist aspirations were not upset as in Cyprus.In 2004, having left the non-aligned movement because of their membership in the EU, Cyprus and Malta did not become members of NATO, like almost all members of 2004.

The failure of the common defense with Greece

After the Turkish invasion, the GDC understands that the good words of the UN and the non-aligned will not be enough to obtain respect for international law.It is essential to find allies to force Turkey to comply with it.Hence attempts, not to win back the north of Cyprus, but to prevent a new invasion and weigh in favor of the opening of reunification negotiations.

It is logical to turn to the United States and the Greek lobby in Washington is working there.In 1975, believing that Turkey used American weapons to invade Cyprus and not to defend itself, the Congress voted for a large majority (298 against 98)) a total embargo on arms sales.Despite its dependence on American supplies for its army, Turkey does not yield and retaliated by restrictions on American military activities in the country.In January 1978, the embargo was canceled after a very contested vote at the Congress (208 against 205)).Paralyzed by the risk of "losing Turkey", the United States will go no further.In 1987, they advanced in the other direction by decreeing an embargo on American arms sales in Cyprus, which was not lifted until 2020.By refusing weapons to the victim to defend himself while resuming deliveries to the invader, Washington could not better mark his desire to consolidate the "fait" of the partition of Cyprus.

GDC turns to Greece.Member of the EU for less than a decade, his foreign policy is still only at the start of his "Europeanization."The end of the Cold War promotes the rise of a nationalist current.Reassured by its membership in the EU, Athens embarks on lonely initiatives by supporting Milošević Serbia and refusing Macedonia the right to bear its name.

This nationalist vision logically extends to Cyprus.In November 1993, Greece agreed to train with the island "a joint defense zone", making a new Turkish attack against Cyprus a casus belli, in order to dissuade Ankara from recurrent.In practice, the construction of an airport in Paphos is decided to facilitate the arrival of Greek help.In January 1997, the GDC decided to buy Russia Sol-Air S-300 missiles with a range of 160 km to install in the Troodos massif and in the Akamas peninsula.This initiative is strongly supported by Greek Cypriot opinion: according to a survey, 88% of those questioned are favorable to the common defense zone and 94% for the purchase of S-300s.

Although it is a purely defensive initiative that does not call into question its military superiority, Ankara multiplies bellicose declarations.To Greece who decides to send troops and an F-16 squadron to Cyprus, she promises war.It threatens the island of a naval blockade to prevent the landing of S-300s and buys ground/ground missiles in Israel to destroy them if they are installed.The attitude of Washington is very elusive: the State Department deplores the purchase of missiles from Russia (while the GDC cannot get their supplies in the United States, since it is still under American embargo)) and criticvery moderately Turkish reactions.In Moscow, which is however beneficiary of the transaction, the Cypriots collect only good words.From Brussels, where Cyprus is awaiting the opening of its membership negotiations, the EU indicates that an escalation would be very counterproductive.

As a result, the Cyprus government renounces installing missiles on the island.To save their face, they will be located in Crete, at a sufficient distance not to irritate Turkey.After the Greco-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean of the previous year which almost degenerated into armed conflict, it clearly appears that attempts to force the Cypriot question in force are condemned to failure.Bringing up the auctions with military equipment does not change the balance of power and only gives a good pretext to Turkey to make "rattling saber".If necessary, this clerk shows that there is no military solution in Cyprus.If you want to move Turkey, you have to find other ways.

The Battle of membership

In Nicosia as in Athens, we have long wondered about the relevance of EU membership, perceived as too Western for an Orthodox country, belonging to the "intermediate region of the Eurasian continent" (Dimitri Kitsikis [2]))Between Western civilization and Islamic countries.With sympathies for the USSR, then Russia, these reluctance has long been expressed by the Communist Party and the Orthodox Church.However, since 1981, Greece's membership (and gradual rallying to this membership of those, especially on the left, who had fought it)) has shown that this option was perfectly compatible with Hellenic identity.In Nicosia, we were also able to measure the advantages of European solidarity and the improvement of the diplomatic position of the Greek government which followed.

In 1987, Cyprus obtained the transition to the customs union provided for by the 1972 association agreement.However, unlike that signed in 1963 with Greece and Turkey, it does not include a commitment of membership, but a transition period which can still be quite long.With the filing of the membership request from Turkey (1987)) and the end of the Cold War, the Cypriots decide to hasten and their candidacy is officially submitted by President Vassiliou [3] in July 1990.

Benefiting from international recognition, the GDC is completely entitled to do so without worrying about protests from the North Administration.However, in an EU concerned not to import conflicts, it is not obvious that it is accepted [4].Several Member States believe that a solution on the island must intervene before membership, possibly before the start of negotiations.The Cypriot government can therefore fear that the EU, which has already taken its time to accept the accession of the island to the Customs Union, will emerge its request.By judging the GDC's request "illegal" "illegal", because it did not receive the agreement of its Cyprus-North Protels, Turkey puts pressure for it to be rejected, possibly taken into account only after its own.But it was postponed Sine Die by a negative opinion from the Commission, adopted a few days after the opening of the Berlin Wall.

In Brussels, Cypriots do not have much support.With the exception of Greece, there is no member state resolutely in its favor.In addition, the EU must deal with candidates from four AELE countries, whose membership negotiations engaged in February 1993 and which represent for it a more important economic issue.But Cyprus does not have a declared opponent either, unless we count as such the United Kingdom.In a procedure where everything is decided unanimously, it can block everything.Although Foreign Office has not recognized "independence" of Cyprus North, it sticks to its geopolitical priorities: the case of Cyprus is to be treated according to its defense policy and its alliance with theUnited States.He must not lead to deterioration of his relations with Turkey.So the less the EU will mix with the island's affairs and the better it will be for London.British diplomacy discreetly advises its partners to wait until the United Nations experts, who are in charge of inter -community talks, have a reunification scheme adopt.

The first step to take is the publication of the "opinion" on the candidacy that the European Commission must give to the Council.Because of its size, the state of progress of its economy and the proper functioning of the customs union, the Commission recognizes that its membership presents no major problem.But vis-à-vis the score of the island, it makes a cautious response: "The commission must finally consider the case where, despite the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, inter-community discussions would not allowbring out a political settlement of the Cypriot issue in the foreseeable future.In such a case, the Commission is of the opinion that it would be necessary to reassess the situation by appreciating the positions expressed by each party in these discussions and to reconsider in January 1995 the question of the membership of Cyprus to the community.»»»»

Diploweb.com Géopolitique de Chypre. 4e Partie.Cyprus and Europe

The Council could therefore pretend to the island division to adjourn its candidacy and confine it in the same waiting room as Turkey.Reflection made, this orientation is unbearable.The debate having continued between 1993 and 1995, it was finally considered that a refusal of the Cypriot candidacy would be to give a third country, Turkey, a right of veto on the enlargement of the European Union, whichThe Treaty recognizes only a Member State.

Above all, Cypriots are no longer alone: with the rise of applications from the countries of Central Europe, the EU is preparing for an overall negotiation. Elle établit une « méthode de l’adhésion »»»» qui définit des critères politiques et économiques [5], ce qui est plutôt positif pour Chypre, qui se compare avantageusement avec des pays tout juste sortis du communisme.However, the negotiation tactics are not without pitfalls: it takes unanimous agreement to open and close each of its chapters.In this context, the role of Greece is potentially decisive: it can block the whole process if Cyprus is not fairly treated, but did not need to do it.

As early as 1995, it is clear that it will be difficult to leave Cyprus outside the great negotiation that will open.Greece has just shown its determination by blocking the EU/Turkey customs union project.At the end of the year, a compromise is found: Turkey accesses the customs union and Cyprus will be in the first group of candidates.In Luxembourg, at the end of 1997, the Council decided to start negotiation with 6 countries, including Cyprus.

In 1998, when it is committed, the game is still far from won.On the one hand, the EU wishes to accommodate a reunified island;On the other hand, we must overcome all the technical obstacles which arise from the implementation of community legislation if the island remains shared.

If the member states are unanimous in estimating that the GDC can act on behalf of the entire island, the Anglo-Saxons press it to involve Turkish Cypriots.When President Clertides [6] their request to designate representatives, they stick to their initial refusal: the candidacy of the island would be illegal, since it did not agree.They thus deprive themselves of a unique opportunity: their presence in the negotiation would obviously have it strongly complicated, if not paralyzed.But Denktaş does not want to know anything about European affairs, whose importance he does not measure.As he manages with great skill in blocking inter -community negotiations at the United Nations, he believes he can do the same with the support. Ensuite, il aggrave son cas en exigeant la reconnaissance préalable de son « État »»»», ce qui le met définitivement hors-jeu.

Turkish political class makes a similar error by unconditionally supporting Denktaş.For decades, as on other files, it shows a remarkable ability to lock itself in solitary positions, which makes it waste precious time.Walled in her certainties, she is not aware of the importance of Copenhagen's criteria and attends without reacting to the multiplication of candidates from the countries of Central Europe.She does not listen to her diplomats and thinks that as NATO, the support of the United States will be enough to hinder the efforts of this Cypriot government that it refuses to recognize.

Bülent Ecevit [7], Premier ministre turc au moment de l’invasion de 1974, continue à croire qu’il a résolu le problème de Chypre en 1974, mais que le reste du monde ne s’en est pas aperçu : son « no solution is a solution »»»» résume une pensée qui compte sur le temps pour obtenir la reconnaissance du fait accompli.Until 1999, the Turkish government believes itself to prevent the island's adhesion, a humiliation for a country whose candidacy remains blocked.

In London, we do not assist without concern for the progress of the Cypriot file, but it is difficult to oppose it openly.The government regularly deplores the island division and the pro-Turkish lobby encourages the press to make a large place for reports favorable to Turkish Cypriots, but the official position remains unchanged.

For the GDC, the problem is to overcome the many technical obstacles to negotiation.President Clerid appoints his predecessor Vassiliou for this, which leads it with great efficiency, by putting its country at the forefront of the number of closed chapters, because the island can present itself with a market economy and experienced administration.

In 2002, when the time of the final decision is coming, it is obvious that Cyprus will not stay away: how to exclude the country that races in mind?And how can we ask the Greek Parliament to ratify a membership treaty (there is only one text for the ten new members)) from which the island would have been excluded?

May 1, 2004 Cyprus became a Member State, but the implementation of the community acquired is suspended in the area not controlled by the legal government, in a configuration comparable to that of Germany in 1958.At the time, Westerners refused to recognize in East Germany something other than an occupation area, which is today the case of Cyprus-North. Cependant, la République démocratique allemande disposait de la reconnaissance internationale des pays du camp socialiste, alors qu’en près d’un demi-siècle, la Turquie n’a pas réussi à faire reconnaître sa « République turque de Chypre du nord »»»» par un seul membre de l’ONU.

However, the major objective of membership for Cypriots, reunification, has not realized.Long paralyzed by Denktaş, the intercommunity negotiations carried out with the United Nations led a few days before membership in the Annan plan in its version n ° 5.This is therefore subject to referendum on both sides of the island: overall 2/3 of Cypriots vote against, but it is accepted by Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greeks.

We will not approach here the internal aspects of the plan established by the United Nations, but only its relationship with Community law.In fact, one of its objectives was to limit the implementation of European legislation, in particular freedom of establishment, in order to allow Turkish Cypriots to remain the majority in the territory which would have been granted to them by the plan.If they had been prior to membership, these provisions would have been permanent derogations that it would have been impossible to modify later.

In the 9,000 pages of the plan, there are also gifts to Turkey, presented at the time as measures of circumstances intended to help Erdoğan to defeat the opposition of his soldiers.Like many others, they result in additional limitations to the sovereignty of the United Republic of Cyprus, but they would also have had a significant impact on community action.Listed in the final version of the plan, they went beyond the mandate of its negotiators, the objective of which should have been limited to providing solutions to the internal problems of the island and not to impose additional international constraints to it.

These would have put the future United Republic of Cyprus, as a member of the EU, in a very uncomfortable position.They were to be registered as primary law of the EU by a proposal from the Commission [8], in the form of an act of adaptation to the EU, to automatically adopt by the Council if the Cypriots had voted inPlanning favor.

Article 5 of this act provided for an equal footing of immigration from Greece and Turkey, while the latter, as a third country could not benefit from the same treatment as a Member State.To this end, the Commission should have negotiated with Turkey's participation of Cyprren in Schengen, which would have returned to depend on a third country the application of Community law to a Member State.

According to article 6 of the act of adaptation, Cyprus would have given up participating in the PESD, which would have made it the only Member State to be excluded, while being maintained under the military occupation of a third country.It was to offer British (and Turks)) a way to hinder the creation of a distinct NATO defense policy.The reunified island would also have given up participating in international military operations without the agreement of Greece and Turkey [9].

There were other satisfactions in Ankara who had nothing to do with the Cyprus problem.Thus, the reunified island would have had the obligation to request its agreement to initiate oil prospecting on the continental set: the recent confrontations in the ZEEs show quite well that it would have been very difficult to satisfy Turkey on this point.

Furthermore, following an additional protocol to the Treaty of Alliance, Cyprus as a member state would have had the obligation to support Turkey's membership.The Anglo-Saxons, for whom the solution of the Cyprus problem was only a step in the process of integration of Turkey into the EU, feared that the reunified island would use its right of veto in negotiations, of which they hoped for the opening in brief maturity.They therefore decided to deprive it, while on the date of the plan (April 2004)) we knew little about the conditions in which Turkey and the EU were going to commit.This subjection would have put a Member State at the service of a candidate country.

Andreas Mavroyiannis stresses that these arrangements, not only brought in the sovereignty of Cyprus, but also that of the whole EU, by introducing Turkey into the game of internal negotiations in the EU. Suivant son expression [10], elles auraient fait de Chypre réunifiée le «cheval de Troie»»»» de la Turquie dans l’UE élargie.

The time of the "Diplomacy Defense"»»»

Since 2004, the geopolitical context in the eastern Mediterranean basin has evolved a lot in the sense of worsening conflicts, due to an increasingly aggressive policy of Turkey, not only vis-à-vis theGreece and Cyprus, but also other countries residents.The island is no longer the only victim of Ankara's policy.Contrary to what we think of Berlin, it is no longer a new push of the old Greco-Turkish antagonism, but the emergence of a very ambitious expansionist project.The rise in tensions inevitably equals greater risks for Cyprus, given its geographic position.In addition, the revival of the interest of the powers also presents the risks of contrary decisions which would be imposed on it.

In Nicosia, the obvious need of a better calibrated foreign policy is the result of adapting to unforeseen circumstances, with opportunities to slide previous policy (qualified as inactive or reactive [11])) to aproactive approach by taking advantage of new developments in regional geopolitics.

Regardless of the national problem, Cyprus' desire is to no longer be a passive partner and to give itself an active role in foreign policy [12], an objective that may seem presumptuous for a country of just over a million'inhabitants and less than 10,000 km².In the context of maintaining unequal treaties and Turkish occupation, it may seem even more derisory. Pourtant, c’est ce que s’efforce de réaliser le GdC pour échapper à son destin de « pawn on the geo-political chess board »»»», afin de devenir pleinement « a modern EU state with its own identity and future.»»»»

The front flight of Turkish foreign policy leads to ankara an increasing isolation which can reserve opportunities for Cyprus, which has suffered a lot from the complacency of Washington for Ankara and the Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership.In Brussels, Brexit ends British pressure in favor of Turkey.And being no longer the only victim of Turkish imperialism, the GDC can find new allies, close (Israel, Egypt)) or distant (the Emirates, Saudi Arabia)).Thus consolidates the trilateral of the democracies of the eastern basin between Cyprus, Greece and Israel.

As always, the essential point is the evolution of the American attitude. L’ « Eastern Mediterranean Security Partnership Act »»»», en faveur de la Grèce et de Chypre se veut une réponse à l’achat des S400 par la Turquie à la Russie.More than the amount of aid ($ 5M)), this is the symbol that counts.Although Washington remains more interested in reconciliation with Turkey, the State Department and especially the Pentagon begin to be discouraged.After Israel understood that it had become impossible to maintain good relations with Turkey, the Americans come to seek alternative solutions: the Sudden Bay base as an alternative to İnclik and new locations further north.Thus, the strengthening of Greek and Cypriot Marines and Air Force is on the agenda.

Nous avons déjà relaté dans la première partie de cette étude les conditions dans lesquelles s’est construit l’ « East Med Gas Forum »»»» (EMGF)).The question that arises is in the ability of participants to expand their cooperation.Since maritime security has become a primary issue, the EU could seek an agreement in this area with countries that respect the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)).The EU can also encourage them to develop their activities in conjunction with its integrated maritime policy.Ultimately, the eastern Mediterranean should be oriented towards the development of a collective security system, at least in the maritime space.

As we have seen, the need to ensure the security of gas exploitation play a decisive role, the central position of Cyprus offering it, for once an opportunity to exploit the advantages of its geography.The result is more intense relations with the countries of the eastern basin, a diversification of his diplomatic landscape which helps Cyprus to extract himself from the constraints of his dependence on Greece and his inevitable confrontation with Turkey.In addition, the growing difficulties between Ankara and the Western powers value Cyprus relations with the United States and its allies.

Il en résulte un développement de sa « défense diplomatie »»»» avec les pays voisins et quelques autres, notamment les États-Unis et la France, en particulier dans le domaine militaire.It is not an exaggeration to think that these new opportunities must (a little)) in the belligerent attitude of Turkey which gradually coalizes the countries of the region against it.In fact, all the countries of the eastern Mediterranean basin (and even beyond that it also concerns France and Italy)) are rightly threatened by Turkish initiatives, which encourages them to consult andput aside some of their disputes.

Because of its size, the small importance of its armed forces and the Turkish occupation of a large part of its territory, Cyprus has more geopolitical than military advantages.It is therefore an important issue in a context of pre -eminence of diplomatic action on a possible and not desired armed confrontation.Initially, while remaining in good terms with these countries, the GDC has not yet developed very close relations with them, especially in the sensitive defense sector.

Anxious not to alienate the protagonists of the Israeli-Arab conflict, Cypriot diplomacy had confined itself to a prudent neutrality.Faced with Turkish threats, it was inevitable that GDC seeks to coordinate with Israel to ensure the safety of drilling platforms which are not far from each other.From 2012, regular contacts between defense ministers developed, followed by joint military exercises since 2014.

With Egypt, cordial relations go back to the joint participation of the two countries in the non-aligned movement.The proximity of the deposits, then the use of Egyptian infrastructure for the liquefaction of gas created complementarities.Since 2015, the Defense Ministers have maintained regular contacts and the Egyptian army has been associated since 2016 since 2016 with gas infrastructure protection exercises (nemesis)).Relations have also been developed with Jordan and Lebanon.

Of course, these are not military alliances, but the exploitation of complementarities with a view to contributing to greater security in maritime space, especially in the gas operating areas.

Map. Situation in Eastern Mediterranean as at 08 September 2020
Cliquer sur la vignette pour agrandir la carte. Copyright : Commission européenne

What the EU did not do

In their race for membership, Cypriots and many others thought that EU’s entry would have an irresistible pressure in favor of reunification.On the one hand, it represented an attractive option for Turkish Cypriots, kept in isolation since the 1974 invasion.On the other hand, it was presumed that Brussels would exercise vis-à-vis Ankara effective pressures.More than a decade after membership, none of this has happened.

For Brussels, the Cyprus problem is a heritage.The EU has agreed to make an exception to its refusal to import neighborhood conflicts.Many Member States believe that they have been generous enough on this occasion so that they are not asked more.Greek Cypriots having refused the Annan plan, they are considered responsible for the persistence of their problem.

Continue to entrust this endless case to the United Nations appears to many as the facility solution.This attitude packed with ease the British, who can thus keep this negotiation under their control, in order to avoid the questioning of their strategic imperatives.In the name of the law of the three guarantors to decide the fate of the island, they oppose an active participation of the EU.As in 2004, it is only awarded a sponsor, while the implementation of the community acquired in the north is one of the essential questions to be resolved.The ineffectiveness of the format of negotiation, which gives the good role to the two guarantors who do not wish to reunify, does not interfere with the majority of member states.

The worsening of conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean shows that it is however a serious error: on the one hand the absence of a solution to Cyprus allows Turkey to continue its attacks and to divide Europeans by disturbing operationalready defective of the European Council.In the economic field, faced with a country in crisis, the EU is not lacking in means, but refuses to use them so as not to harm the interests of its companies.Discussions in the Council confirm the influence of arms sellers in the foreign policy of their countries: according to the SIPRI [13] over the period 2015-2020 more than 40% of arms sales to Turkey come from the'Italy and Spain, which explains that the two countries are very reluctant to stop them.For its part, Germany refuses to block the sale of six submarines (a market of $ 3.5 billion)), despite the technological advantage it brings to Turkey and the essential role thatThey could play in the conflict on the delimitation of the ZEEs in the Mediterranean.By opposing the embargo, these countries show both their commercial priorities and their little concern for the security of their partners.

Par ailleurs, son impuissance nuit à la crédibilité de l’UE sur d’autres affaires : en effet, ne pas être en mesure de trouver une solution à un problème jugé interne à l’Union disqualifie Bruxelles sur les conflits externes (soi-disant « gelés »»»» dans l’ex-URSS et en Méditerranée)) et l’expose à d’autres formes de chantage.These are booming, in particular by using migratory pressures, possibly terrorism.

Conclusion: Return to international law

In the early 1950s, after three quarters of a century of colonial administration which had maintained the island away from the convulsive collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus seemed promised to a brilliant destiny.Still fragile, his economy already gave him a standard of living above that of Greece.And the wish to self -determination of Greek Cypriots seemed compatible with the will of the colonial power to solidly maintain the island in the Western defense system recently reinforced by the adhesion of Greece and Turkey at NATO, in thecontext of the containment organized by the United States in the time of the Cold War.

Comme l’a bien expliqué Lawrence Durrell dans son « Citrons acides »»»», si les Chypriotes grecs aspiraient depuis des décennies à l’Enosis, ils n’étaient pas si pressés d’y parvenir et n’avaient pas d’objection à concilier cet objectif avec l’attribution au Royaume-Uni de bases permanentes, que ce soit à Chypre ou en Grèce. À l’époque, leur vision géopolitique du problème était en avance sur celle des Britanniques encore accrochés au régime colonial et à leur politique des « points d’appui»»»» remontant au XVIIIe siècle.

Cette volonté de maintenir à tout prix leur souveraineté (le « never»»»» du Secrétaire d’État Hopkinson dont la maladresse a été justement soulignée par Durrell)), puis leurs efforts pour impliquer la Turquie dans le débat sur l’avenir de Chypre ont rendu le problème inextricable, dans une obstination récurrente à contrarier les aspirations de 80% de la population de l’île.

The independence granted in 1960 could have become a lasting solution if it had not been accompanied by an impracticable constitution and a right of interference granted to the three guaranteed powers, each of which has used and abusedCypriots.Not only was the problem not solved, but it has constantly worsened until the Turkish invasion of 1974, caused by the stupidity of the Greek colonels and encouraged by the United States.If democracy was restored in Greece, opening the way to EU membership, it was the Cypriots who paid the price, by ethnic cleaning and the permanent presence of 35,000 Turkish Turkish soldiers.Since that date, all attempts at solution have failed before the Turkish will to maintain its conquest.

Without entering the internal problems of Cyprus and limiting us to their geopolitical aspects, some elements must be recalled, before trying to project themselves into the future.

Dans « My Deposition »»»», l’ancien président Glafkos Clerides a bien situé les responsabilités des Chypriotes grecs : « we have been our worst ennemies[14] »»»» par une succession d’erreurs de calculs et de refus de compromis, en écartant des solutions jugées désavantageuses pour être confrontés ensuite à d’autres encore plus défavorables, y compris du temps de Makarios qui comme le rapporte aussi Clerides, a commencé à être raisonnable quand il était trop tard [15].

As for the Muslim minority, 18% of the population in 1960, its wish was to be able to survive as an organized group, regardless of Turkey.By being manipulated by London, then by Ankara, Turkish Cypriots have lost all ability to weigh on their destiny.They harvested ten years of confinement in enclaves (1964-1974)), ethnic cleaning (more than 50% of their population was moved)) and 47 years of occupation by a foreign army, which still claims to have saved them'a so-called genocide.On several occasions, the authentic Turkish Cypriots, about to be drowned in the mass of Anatolian immigrants, have tried to express a divergent point of view, without having managed to bring it out in the negotiation process piloted by the United Nations, where its representatives have never moved away from total docility to the instructions of Ankara.Almost half a century after the invasion, North Cyprus is still, according to the Strasbourg Human Rights Court, "a subordinate local administration of Turkey [16]"»»».Since 2020, the disputed election of a president in the orders of Ankara deprived him of representativeness.There is no more Turkish Cypriot State than independent republics of Abkhazia or Southern Ossetia.

Pour beaucoup de Chypriotes, leurs malheurs découlent de la « malignité britannique »»»» (Mallinson)) à qui ils attribuent la genèse du problème et surtout sa volonté (ce que conteste le FCDO)) de convergence objective avec la Turquie pour conserver leurs bases militaires, comme l’a montré leur attitude dans la négociation du plan Annan.Not only has their geopolitical vision constantly opposed the aspirations of Greek Cypriots, but it did not contribute to the solution of a problem that could have been resolved after the end of the Cold War.

By marrying the British point of view, the United States has done much worse.Without their support, the Turkish invasion of 1974 would not have taken place and a compromise would have ended up emerging with the assistance of the United Nations experts. Adepte de la solution des crises « à chaud »»»», Henry Kissinger a favorisé un partage de facto de l’île, soi-disant pour réconcilier la Grèce et la Turquie et renforcer le flanc sud de l’OTAN.Not only did the internal problem of the island not received a start of solution, but the Greco-Turkish confrontation has perpetuated.Then Washington considered that the persistence of its occupation in Cyprus was the price to pay to ensure the maintenance of Turkey in the Atlantic Alliance. « To play nice with Turkey »»»» était le message adressé à l’Europe, dont on voit aujourd’hui le résultat.

At first, Turkey exploited the opportunities offered by the Anglo-Saxons, then the blunders of the Greek Cypriots.For having had reasons to intervene in Cyprus, but not to have wanted to negotiate her withdrawal, she placed herself in permanent offense with international law without paying the price.The tolerance of the Anglo-Saxons, the inertia of the United Nations and then of the European Union allowed it to escape the consequences of its obstinacy.Its impunity allows it today to develop geopolitical ambitions unacceptable for its Mediterranean neighbors.

By claiming that the occupation of Cyprus is essential for the survival of Turkish Cypriots and the security of Anatolia, it is trapped in an archaic vision of geostrategy which did a lot of trouble in Europe in the first halfof the XXth century.Do France and the Netherlands claim to take care of the internal affairs of Belgium because it has linguistic problems?Does Italy security require a military base in Corsica or Malta?As Mikhail Gorbachev had pointed out, "we do not buy his security at the expense of that of others. »»»» Mais la tolérance dont bénéficie la Turquie l’a conduite à faire monter les enchères en revendiquant une ZEE en contradiction avec les normes UNCLOS et à multiplier les provocations, y compris dans des pays fort éloignés.It is no longer a question of peace in Cyprus, or even of reconciling Greece and Turkey.The problem is in the activism of the latter, which undermines the security of many countries and not only in the Mediterranean.

The result is a growing isolation of Ankara who does not impress its leaders, long used to defending lonely positions.By behaving in an irascible neighbor who cheerfully violates the co -ownership regulations without suffering the consequences, the Turkish regime excludes any form of compromise.

We have seen how the European Union inserted itself with great timidity in the eastern Mediterranean, by taking a long time to achieve the inadequacy of its instruments.This is the obvious case of the integration scheme that she tried to apply to Ankara, who has not only revealed a bad candidate, but has become a particularly hostile neighbor.In addition, the inter-mediterranean policy of Brussels, which has become European neighborhood (PEV)), only obtained limited results in the eastern basin, where the EU does not have the same influence as in the western basin or inOriental partnership countries.Only Member State of the Union at the center of this part of the Mediterranean, Cyprus undergoes the consequences.

But his problem is another nature.Its internationally recognized government undergoes an occupation, the end of which should appear in the first rank of common priorities.It is not an exaggeration to recognize that since 2004, this has not been the case.By maintaining her confidence in the format of negotiation led by the United Nations who confines Cypriots in a camisole of community force, she did not obtain what should have been his objective: the integration of Cyprus North in the Community territory whoseHe is officially part.While this is an internal EU affair, limiting itself to an observer role should not have been accepted by Brussels.As with the Palestinians, the European taxpayer significantly finances the Turkish Cypriot community without being involved in negotiations, unlike the guaranteed powers which have a decision -making power without paying anything.It was not already a good idea in Palestine;Regarding an internal question in the EU, it is not appropriate either.

From this passivity follows a large part of the difficulties encountered by the EU with Turkey, thus "encouraged" to multiply its attacks.Faced with a problem that is no longer only, neither Cypriot, nor even Greco-Turkish, the hesitations of the European Council are an aggravating factor which discredits the action of the Union and encourages violations of international law.The absence of a firm reaction of the EU can only encourage predatory governments, not only in Moscow, but also regional powers which assert themselves in the European outskirts.

Une Commission qui se veut géopolitique ne peut pas s’en désintéresser : elle doit rapidement mettre en place les « mesures qui font mal »»»», touchant l’union douanière et surtout les ventes d’armes afin de rétablir un minimum de sécurité en Méditerranée.

Return Cyprus, failing the oriental basin in international law should be the priority of the EU, the United Nations and the Great Powers.It is not a question of combining one or the other of the powers, but of enforcing fundamental principles.We sketch five components below.Is it a utopia impossible to achieve?

Arms race end

Although naval weapons are expensive, the activism of one of the riparian countries is enough to trigger a race from which it is difficult to predict the term.By equipping herself with a force which it does not need, since it is not threatened on its maritime borders, Turkey has forced Greece, yet still in the austerity phase, to strongly increase its military spending.As soon as they have the possibility, the other residents will follow.

As these equipment is largely imported and local manufacturing also depend on components sold by large OECD exporters, a suspension of arms sales, possibly a selective embargo are the appropriate measures to calm the bellicose hints of the countriesThe most aggressive, at the forefront of Turkey, since the other residents buy weapons without using them, at least in the immediate.

In this area, the United States is not exemplary, but it began to react to the purchase by Turkey from S-400, excluding it from the new F-35 aircraft program and especially by applying itSanctions provided for by Congress for CAATSA.When Canada understood the essential role of parts provided by its industry to Turkish drones in the Karabakh war, it suspended its deliveries.

It is a huge responsibility for the EU for not wanting to do it under pressure from his arms dealers (Germany, Spain and Italy in particular)), who have been able to influence their governments, who have not shown a lot of'Interest in the security of their partners.This abstention encouraged Turkey has continued its armaments, in particular by installing drones in Cyprus on Lefkoniko aerodrome, where they can directly threaten the south of the island, as well as the British bases.

There should therefore not be an opposition to decree a selective embargo for arms sales to Turkey and to use it as a means of pressure to obtain a de -escalation in the Mediterranean, either by an EU initiative or byA decision of the Security Council, where Turkey cannot count on resolved supports, with the exception of that of the United Kingdom which has recently mobilized to mitigate the effects of the conviction of Ankara's actions in Varosha.By account, it would be illusory to wait for NATO support, which has been unable to criticize the recent Turkish attacks, even when they affected two members of the Alliance, Greece and France.

Apply UNCLOS

The existence of the UNCLOS Convention represents major progress for the international community.On a sensitive question, almost all countries of the world have reached an agreement on a detailed text that even those who have not signed or ratified it, with the exception of Turkey.There is therefore no alternative to the government of Ankara, in law or in fact, decides to respect the Convention and to subject its disputes if necessary to the arbitration of the International Court of The Hague.

He could then request his admission to the Gas Forum and start negotiations to participate in the marketing of the excess gas produced.As a importance of massive quantities of natural gas, he would find a reliable source of supply, which would balance his energy dependence.Otherwise, the international community must take advantage of the isolation of Turkey to exert the necessary pressures.

Comply with the United Nations Charter

We showed the limits of the guarantee treaty, imposed in Cyprus in 1959, violated fifteen years later by the three powers, so -called guarantors, an anachronism which has no equivalent in the world of the 21st century and that theAdhesion from Cyprus to the EU has rendered without object.Turkey's attitude shows that this treaty also represents a danger to peace.The right of intervention mentioned in this treaty must therefore end, explicitly or implicitly.

We have shown how he is in contradiction with the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the articles which proscribe the use of force and give it a legal pre -eminence on other international agreements.Recognizing this pre -eminence would make the guarantee and alliance treaties decade.

Having become a fully sovereign state, without questioning the status of the British bases which were the subject of the 2014 arrangement, the Republic of Cyprus could then demand the departure of the troops.47 years after the invasion, this possibility may seem illusory.Yet large countries much larger than Turkey have accepted it, notably the former colonial powers, Russia (for the benefit of the Baltic countries)) and even the United States by retroceding the area of the canal in Panama, which they held infull sovereignty.

For the British who often thought without openly saying that their presence in Cyprus was perpetuated by that of Turkey, this would represent the questioning of a policy which dates back to the 1950s.But when Erdoğan wants to install his drones on the island, wouldn't the interests of Anglo-Saxons be better preserved if there was no more Turkish army in Cyprus?

Respect the acquis community

In international law, Cyprus (and not only the government part)) is part of the EU.There is therefore no alternative to the implementation of the community acquired to restore the rule of law there.Since 2017, in inter -community negotiations, it is explicitly recognized by the two parties that reunification must be carried out within the European framework, a rare element of consensus between the two parties.

The development of a scheme for implementing the acquired in the northern part should therefore be undertaken by the European Commission in order to have it approved by the Council, possibly not the United Nations, as an element of solution with the problem withthe necessary transitions and inevitable accommodation to spare the interests of all the parties present.

Let the Cypriots decide on their own destiny

It is recognized that a sovereign country is free to define its institutions, which was not the case of Cyprus, to whom the 1960 constitution was successively imposed and the Annan plan.It should therefore be obvious that it is up to its inhabitants to find for themselves and without external influence the solution which will restore functional coexistence between the two parts of the island.

A number of recent surveys shows that the majority of Cypriots are in favor of reunification, the opinions only diverging on the modalities.On the other hand, there is no majority, neither among Greek Cypriots, nor most likely among the authentic Turkish Cypriots, in favor of two independent states, a pseudo-solution not in accordance with the United Nations resolutions, which would only berecognition of the facts carried out by Turkey in violation of international law.

In the absence of adequate representativeness of Turkish Cypriots, the United Nations negotiation format has long been exceeded.Not only did he not produce results, but he is paralyzed by Turkish obstruction. Il appartient donc aux Chypriotes de s’organiser pour faire émerger une « assemblée constituante »»»» en mesure de construire de nouvelles institutions, un problème interne que nous avons choisi de ne pas aborder dans ce texte.

The implementation of these provisions may seem illusory.However, it is only a question of applying fundamental elements of international law in Cyprus, too long ignored in the region, in the name of strategic priorities which have not produced so many positive results, both for the island of the islandonly for the great powers that imposed them to him.

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You have just read the 4th part of the J-F Drevet study, geopolitics of Cyprus.Cyprus and Europe.


See the first part of this J-F Drevet study, geopolitics of Cyprus.See the second part.See the third part.See the fourth part.


Bibliography

An observer not reading neither the Greek nor the Turk will find an abundant documentation in English, which offers it both factual information on the evolution of the island and the opinions, sometimes very contrasting of the protagonists, including non -Cypriotes.

Nomenclature problems

The expressions used can give rise to controversy, each parts using a different vocabulary, more or less well translated in English (most often)) or in French.Unless you juxtapose the terms used on both sides, we had to make choices.

Regarding toponymy, we used the names of international cards: Famagouste preferably in Ammokhostos (Greek)) or Gazi Mağusa (Turkish)), Nicosia preferably at Levkosia (Greek)) or Levkoşa (Turkish)).For the other places we used the nomenclature officially in force in the Republic of Cyprus, adding in parentheses the name used in Northern Cyprus when it was necessary for understanding the text.For example, we added Ercan to Tymbou for northern airport, since he is better known by his Turkish name.A Greek/Turkish list of the most used location names is added below.

Index of geographic names

InternationalGrecTurc
FamagousteAmmochōstosGazimağusa
KyréniaKeryneiaGirne
LarnacaLarnakaLarnaka
LefkonikoLefkonoikoGeçitkale
LimassolLemasosLimasol
MorphouMorfouGüzelyurt
NicosieLefkosiaLefkoşa
PaphosPafosGazibaf
RizokarpasoRizokarpasoDipkarpaz
TrikomoTrikōmoIşkele
TymbouTymvouErcan

For people's names, we used international transcription for Greek names in Cyprus (most often from English)).The Turks having adopted the Latin alphabet with some particularities [17], we maintained the original spelling (Erdoğan, Denktaş, etc..)) even when there is an international transcription (Erdogan, Denktash etc.)).

LaRépublique de Chypres’étend sur toute l’île, après 1974 comme avant, à l’exception du territoire concédé aux bases britanniques (Sovereign Base Areas)) en 1960 et le gouvernement légal, seul reconnu par les Nations unies (à l’exception de la Turquie)), est réputé représenter l’ensemble de l’île. Conformément à l’usage international, nous avons utilisé l’expression gouvernement de Chypre, GdC (Government of Cyprus, GoC)) pour ce gouvernement et administration du Nord pour la « RTCN »»»» ou « République turque de Chypre du nord »»»» (« Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, TRNC »»»»)) avec les guillemets de rigueur, puisqu’elles n’ont pas reçu de reconnaissance internationale.

Nous avons retenu le terme de Chypre sud ou Sud pour la zone gouvernementale, restée sous l’autorité du gouvernement légal et de Chypre nord ou Nord, pour ce qui est aussi connu sous le nom de zone occupée, ou de « République turque de Chypre du nord, RTCN »»»» depuis 1983.

For the names of peoples or communities, we used Greek Cypriots for the Christian community, Turkish Cypriots for the Muslim community, in Greek and Turkish summary when the context clearly indicates that they were not nationals of neighboring countries.Due to their controversial character, we have avoided resorting to the terms of minority or majority for the two communities, which does not change the arithmetic.

In the north, the legal government recognizes as Turkish Cypriots only the inhabitants who had Cypriot nationality before 1974 and their descendants, who probably became a minority among current residents.For lack of better, we still used the Turkish Cypriot expression for Northern residents, whatever their origin.

La République de Chypre étant dans la zone € depuis le 1er janvier 2008, nous avons utilisé de préférence cette monnaie sauf pour les données en dollars américains (US$)) des statistiques internationales.

Abreviations list

AcronymeFrançaisAutre langue
AKPParti de la justice et du développementAdalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
CEDHCour européenne des droits de l’hommeEuropean Court of Human Rights (ECHR))
GdCGouvernement de ChypreGovernment of Cyprus (GoC))
EMGFForum est-méditerranéen du gazEast Mediterraean Gas Forum
ENISociété nationale italienne des hydrocarburesEnte Nazionale Idrocarburi
FCDOMinistère britannique des Affaires étrangères, du Commonwealth et du DéveloppementForeign, Commonwealth & Development Office
MEDORMéditerranée orientaleEASTMED
MITOrganisation nationale du renseignementMillî Istihbarat Teşkılatı
ONUOrganisation des Nations uniesUnited Nations Organisation
OTANOrganisation du traité de l’Atlantique nordNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO))
PACPolitique Agricole Commune
PESDPolitique européenne de sécurité et de défenseEuropean Security and Defence Policy
PKKParti des Travailleurs du KurdistanPartiya Karkerên Kurdistan
PNUDProgramme des Nations unies pour le développementUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP))
PRIOInstitut de Recherche sur la Paix d’OsloPeace Research Institute Oslo
RdCRépublique de ChypreRepublic of Cyprus (RoC))
RTCNRépublique turque de Chypre-nordKıbrıs Kuzey Türk Cumhuriyeti (KKTC))
SBAsZones de Souveraineté (ZdS))Sovereign Base Areas
SIPRIInstitut International de Recherche sur la Paix de StockholmStockholm International Peace Research Institute
TMTOrganisation de défense turqueTürk Mudafa Teskilat
TPAOCompagnie nationale turque du pétroleTürkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı
UEUnion européenneEuropean Union (EU))
UNCLOSConvention des Nations unies sur le Droit des Mers (CNUDM))United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas
UNFICYPForce de maintien de la paix des Nations unies à ChypreUnited Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
ZEEZone économique exclusiveExclusive Economic Zone (EEZ))

Main works consulted

Emel Akçali, Cyprus, a current geopolitical issue, L’Harmattan, Paris 2010.Perry Anderson, The Divisions of Cyprus, London Review of Books, Vol.No. 30.8 · 24 April 2008.Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay, Turkish Perceptions of Cyprus, 1948 to the present, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Prio Cyprus Center, Nicosia, 1/2015 58 p.ZBIGNIENE BRZEZINSKI, Le Grand Echiquier, America and the rest of the world, Hachette, Paris 1997, 273 p.Glafkos cleriads, My Deposition, Alithia Publishing, Nicosie, 1992, 4 volumes.Nancy CRAWSHAW, The Cyprus revolt, an account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978, 447 p.Seth CROPSEY & Eric BROWN, Energy : The West’s Strategic Opportunity in the Eastern Mediterranean, Hudson Institute, Washington, décembre 2014, 47 p.Serhat s.Çubukçuoğlu, Turkey ‘S exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean Sea: The Case of Castellorizo, Master’s Thesis, Fletcher School, July 2014, 52 p.Jean-François Drevet Cyprus in Europe, Harmattan editions, Paris, 2000, 327 p.Jean-François Drevet Cyprus between Europe and Turkey, Karthala editions, Paris, 2011, 252 p.Lawrence Durrell, Acids Lemons, Buchet Chastel editions, Paris, 1982, 345 p.Fabian Bureau, Strategic Colonies and Their Future, The Problems of Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Fabian Research Series N ° 100, October 1945.René GROUSSET (1885-1952)), l’Empire du Levant, histoire de la question d’Orient, Payot, Paris 1979, pp.368-370.Keith HAMILTON & Patrick SALOMON The Southern Flank in crisis, 1973-1976, Documents on British Overseas Policy, Series III, Vol.V, London Routledge, 2014.David Hannay, Cyprus, The Search for A Solution, IB Tauris, London New York, 2007, 256 p.Dimitri Kitsikis, the Ottoman Empire, Que sais-je n ° 2222, PUF, Paris 1985, 127 p.Alexandros LORDOS, Erol KAYMAK & Nathalie TOCCI, A people’s peace in Cyprus, Testing Public Opinion on the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement, Centre for European Policy Studies, Bruxelles, 2009, 128 p.William Roger LOUIS, The British Empire and the Middle East (1945-1951)), Clarendon Press Oxford 1984, 820 p.William Mallinson, Cyprus, Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations, i.B. Tauris, Londres & New York, 2009, 228 p.William MALLINSON & Zoran RISTIC, The Threats of Geopolitics to International Relations, Obsession with the Heartland, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2016.133 p.Michael MASON & Rebecca BRYANT, Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus, Climate change and the Turkey-north Cyprus water pipeline, PRIO report Oslo 1/2017, 27 p.Andreas Mavroyiannis, The Geopolitical Role of Cyprus in the Wider Context of the European Union.Mustafa Ergün Olgun, Hydrocarbons Will Determine The Political Future of Cyprus, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, October 2019, 21 p.Behlül ÖZKAN, Making Cyprus a National Cause in Turkey’s Foreign Policy 1948-1965, Southeast European and Black Sea studies 15(4)), pp.541-562.Claire Palley, an International Relations Debacle, The Un Secretary General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 1999-2004, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon 2005, 395 p.Marinos Papaioakeim, The Rise of the Republic of Cyprus ’Defense Diplomacy in Its Neighbourhood, The Cyprus Review, University of Nicosia, February 2019, pp.95-112.Setaş Sonan, Ebru Küçükşener and Enis Porat, Politics and Society in Northern Cyprus, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2020.Zenonas Tziarras, Cyprus ’Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Trilateral Partnerships: A Neoclassical Realist Approach, Nicosie, Prio 219, pp.53-72.Andrekos Varnava, British Cyprus and the Long Great War, 1914-1925, Empire, Loyalty and Democratic Deficit, Routledge, 242P.and British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The inconsistial possession, Manchester University Press, 2009, 321 p.US Geological Survey Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean, March 2010, 4p.USGS.Gov/FS/2010/3014/PDF/FS10-3014.PDFWORLD BANK Group SECURING SECURING Water supply under Extreme Scarcity, Lessons and Perspectives from the Republic of Cyprus ,, Washington, June 2018, 93 p.

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